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Abstract
Decision-making is at the heart of entrepreneurship. Unsurprisingly, entrepreneurship 
research has engaged with processes of entrepreneurial decision-making resulting, most 
importantly, in the notions of causation, effectuation, and enactment. Nevertheless, the 
range of processes delineated to date remains somewhat incomplete. Drawing on cru-
cial insights from the analysis of decision problem structures reveals that entrepreneur-
ship theory has lacked a process that both recognizes the ill-structuredness typically 
surrounding entrepreneurial decisions and places prognoses center stage. While effectua-
tion implicitly addresses structural defects but denies prognoses a central role, causation 
emphasizes the importance of predictions while being associated with well-structured, 
risky environments, and thus, unaffected by structural defects. Theorizing about a com-
bination thereof, that is, a process recognizing and considering the ill-structuredness of 
entrepreneurial environments yet building on predictions of the future is overdue. This 
paper, therefore, seeks to foster a more comprehensive yet nuanced understanding of 
entrepreneurial decision-making processes by outlining the intrinsic features of one such 
process that we term execution and relating it to existing processes.
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1 Introduction
“Entrepreneurship is increasingly considered a milestone on the road towards pro-
gress” (Ribeiro-Soriano and Kraus 2018 referencing Semrau et  al. 2016); unsur-
prisingly, therefore, entrepreneurship continues to attract considerable attention 
(Ferreira et al. 2019). Among the various streams of entrepreneurship research (Fer-
reira et al. 2019), one definition condenses the concept down to, “reasoned action in 
uncertainty” (Packard et al. 2017: 841). As action presupposes some kind of deci-
sion to act one way or another (including non-action), entrepreneurship research has 
placed the study of entrepreneurial decision-making in the face of uncertainty at its 
core (Shepherd et al. 2015). Research has inter alia centered on particular decision-
making processes available to entrepreneurs, such as causation, effectuation, and 
enactment (Bhowmick 2015; Chandler et  al. 2011; Read et  al. 2009; Sarasvathy 
2001, 2008). In addition—and somewhat related to the discussion on the various 
processes entrepreneurs (can) employ—a vigorous debate on the potential value of 
planning (Shane and Delmar 2004), specifically in new venture creation (Chwolka 
and Raith 2012; Gruber 2007), has ensued.
While the outlined paths of recent scholarship have spurred considerable pro-
gress in entrepreneurship research, theorizing on entrepreneurial decision-making 
processes remains somewhat incomplete. Drawing upon the well-established con-
cept of decision problem structures which have long been known to exert a strong 
causal impact on the process utilized by decision-makers, this paper identifies a gap 
in the range of processes comprising causation, effectuation, and enactment. Causa-
tion, which largely builds on the idea of predicting the future, has been associated 
with well-structured decisions taken under risk and, as such, as being unsuitable 
for entrepreneurial decisions taken under Knightian uncertainty (Knight 1921). In 
contrast, effectuation (Sarasvathy 2001) has been developed as causation’s opposite 
number, taking into account the uncertainty and ill-structuredness entrepreneurs 
usually face while restricting the use of predictions only to situations where they 
are unavoidable. Enactment to some extent resembles both causation and effectua-
tion: Similarly to effectuation, enactment too supposedly gets along without predic-
tions, putting initial action before sensemaking, which takes place only ex post. In a 
manner comparable to causation, enactment sidesteps the issue of ill-structuredness, 
albeit for different reasons.
However, to date the discussion has not encompassed a process that recognizes 
the uncertain, ill-structured decision environment yet still realizes how prognoses 
may be necessary, that is, a process offering a middle ground between causation 
and effectuation. Consequently, this paper encourages a broader, more nuanced pic-
ture of processes supporting entrepreneurial decision-making by outlining a notion 
of predictive entrepreneurial decision-making under Knightian uncertainty and ill-
structuredness more broadly: We term that process execution.
Responding to a call from Shepherd et  al. (2015) and in line with Packard et  al. 
(2017), the paper takes a processual perspective characterizing entrepreneurial decision-
making in terms of a revolving process and, thus, in terms of a period of time including 
recursive judgment rather than in terms of a single decision at a particular point in time.
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2  The structure of decision problems and entrepreneurial 
decision‑making processes
2.1  Structure of decision problems
Entrepreneurial decisions are multifarious. They range from starting a new ven-
ture (e.g., Forlani and Mullins 2000) to exiting an established one (e.g., DeTienne 
et al. 2015), spanning the entire life cycle of a particular venture and beyond, and 
including decisions about financing (e.g., de Bettignies and Brander 2007), prod-
uct innovation (e.g., Dougherty and Heller 1994), and the timing and mechanism 
of market entry (e.g., Lévesque and Shepherd 2004).
Normative decision theory delineates characteristics required of decision prob-
lems to allow for a so-called rational choice (Arrow 1951a, b; Hansson 1994; Lan-
glois 1982; Sarasvathy 2001; Simon and Newell 1958; Wilson and Alexis 1962). In 
short, those problems must be “well structured” (Simon and Newell 1958: 4). Well-
structuredness is present whenever the underlying decision problem “can be formu-
lated explicitly and quantitatively, and […] then be solved by known and feasible 
computational techniques” (Simon and Newell 1958: 5). The decision-maker must 
know what options are available, what are the potential outcomes of those options, 
how they can be appraised, and how the decision problem can be solved bearing in 
mind the well-specified goal(s) of the decision-maker. Those prerequisites place a 
decision-maker in the position to choose the optimal solution to a problem and, thus, 
to make a so-called rational choice (Ariely 2009; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; 
Miller 2007; von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944; Savage 1954; Simon 1976).
Typical entrepreneurial decisions, however, are far from being well-structured; 
quite the contrary in fact. Entrepreneurs (may) face decision problems afflicted 
with various structural defects causing them to perceive decision environments 
as ill-structured rather than well-structured (Adam and Witte 1979; Newell 1969; 
Reitman 1964; Simon 1973; Simon and Newell 1958). Ill-structuredness occurs 
whenever decision problems fail to correspond to the entire range of character-
istics outlined above. In other words: “Problems are ill-structured when they are 
not well-structured” (Simon and Newell 1958: 5).
The gamut of structural defects potentially causing ill-structuredness 
encompasses:
1. Unspecified or conflicting goals (see, for instance, the discussion of “a multi-
objective theory of the firm” by Pies et al. (2019)) (prompting a goal defect; as 
for instance, if an entrepreneur has in mind a particular idea for a venture yet 
has a strong inclination toward safety that conflicts with making the investments 
required to transform the idea into action),
2. Limited knowledge about future outcomes of current action (prompting a cau-
sality defect; for instance, whenever an entrepreneur launches a new product, 
whether consumers will appreciate and purchase the product is highly uncertain. 
In other words, the future effects of current action are not well-known in advance),
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3. The inability to appraise different options to act (prompting an appraisement 
defect; as when the aspired-to effects of an action are not easily quantifiable; for 
instance, if an entrepreneur makes a strategic decision on whether or not to enter 
a new line of business), and
4. Failure to computationally solve the decision problem at hand (prompting a solv-
ability defect; for instance, if an entrepreneur faces particular forms of sequence 
problems, such as processing incoming orders or deciding on the route for deliv-
ery services) (Adam and Witte 1979; Wilson and Alexis 1962; Witte 1979).
Given that research addressing entrepreneurship mostly interprets uncertainty 
in terms of options available to the entrepreneur and possible outcomes of those 
options (Foss and Klein 2012; Milliken 1987; Packard et al. 2017; Townsend et al. 
2018), it is evident that uncertainty thus defined largely matches one particular facet 
of ill-structuredness, namely the causality defect.
Ill-structuredness of various kinds prohibits entrepreneurs from making optimal 
decisions; instead they are constrained to seeking a satisficing (Simon 1976) solu-
tion to the initial problem (Beckert and Bronk 2018; Gigerenzer 2008; Wilson and 
Alexis 1962).
2.2  Entrepreneurial decision‑making processes: causation, effectuation, 
and enactment
2.2.1  Process features
Causation, effectuation, and enactment and its derivatives (see, for instance, Welter 
et al. 2016 on the interrelations between effectuation and creation and bricolage the-
ories) have been among the processes discussed most often in the context of entre-
preneurial decision-making. Therefore, we will concentrate on these three processes 
and investigate them in light of our framework of decision problem structures. To do 
so, it is necessary to first outline their respective features and to delineate them from 
one another, at least analytically, even though they might co-occur, intertwine, and 
overlap in actual human reasoning (Bhowmick 2015; Sarasvathy 2001).
In her seminal paper, Sarasvathy (2001) introduces a theory of effectuation and 
contrasts this decision-making process with its counterpart causation. Fundamen-
tally, she distinguishes between the two based on the underlying logic of each of 
the processes. While she associates causation with prediction, she emphasizes the 
role of control in effectuation. Causation is linked to well-structured decision prob-
lems (Sarasvathy 2001) and, in short, rests on the idea that entrepreneurs choose 
“optimal” paths of action in the present which are believed to maximize possible 
future returns as predicted by the entrepreneur. The entrepreneur is hence aware of 
the desired end and selects the alternative from the option set that he or she believes 
will deliver that end best possible.
Effectuation has been argued to take the opposite stance (Bhowmick 2011; Dew 
et  al. 2008; Dew and Sarasvathy 2002; Grégoire and Cherchem 2020; Read and 
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Sarasvathy 2005; Schneider 2018; Tumidei et  al. 2020) and has been juxtaposed 
with causation in different respects (Dew et al. 2009; Fisher 2012; Read and Saras-
vathy 2005; Shirokova et al. 2020). Effectuation describes a process apt for facing an 
environment which is uncertain and ill-structured to a degree that does not make it 
possible to predict the future; alternatively, effectuation leans on the idea that to “the 
extent that we can control the future, we do not need to predict it” (Sarasvathy 2001: 
252). Therefore, effectuation processes take a limited set of means as given (rather 
than the aspired effect as in causation processes) and—predetermining a particular 
level of affordable loss—focus on the various effects which can be created through 
control of the available means while making use of strategic alliances and exploit-
ing contingencies over time. Therefore, the “distinguishing characteristic between 
causation and effectuation is in the set of choices: choosing between means to create 
a particular effect, versus choosing between many possible effects using a particular 
set of means. Whereas causation models consist of many-to-one mappings, effectua-
tion models involve one-to-many mappings” (Sarasvathy 2001: 245). The concept 
of bricolage, first elucidated by Lévi-Strauss (1967)—and first applied to the field 
of entrepreneurship by Baker and Nelson (2005)—while differing in detail, largely 
resembles the notion of effectuation. It does so in particular because of its central 
tenet of “making do with what is at hand” (Baker and Nelson 2005: 329). Accord-
ingly, it too starts from consideration of the constrained resources available to the 
entrepreneur. Given the strong ties between both bricolage and effectuation (Fisher 
2012), we focus the following discussion expressly on effectuation; however, the 
findings derived are not limited to effectuation per se but apply similarly to related 
approaches too.
Enactment, which borrows from Weick’s sensemaking conception (Weick 1979, 
1995; Weick et al. 2005), essentially describes the idea of non-directed action that 
is made sense of only after it took place (Bhowmick 2015). Therefore, enactment in 
some sense resembles effectuation and contrasts with causation (Sarasvathy 2001). 
Both effectuation and enactment rest on the premise that the dynamic environment 
is too uncertain to be predicted and, hence, does not fall into the scope of causal 
reasoning with its optimization analyses. Both effectuation and enactment empha-
size the constructive feature of eventual outcomes rather than the predictive feature. 
Consequently, Bhowmick (2015: 519) states: “In a fundamental way, both concepts 
give primacy to action over pre-planning in explicating organizing and exploring.”
While enactment and effectuation are similar in some respects, they are also dis-
tinct from each other, in particular with regard to the directedness of action (Bhow-
mick 2015). While the enactment concept puts non-directed action before sense-
making, the effectuation logic implies that entrepreneurial action targets control. 
Moreover, the given set of means is central to the effectuation logic, while enact-
ment gets along without explicit reference to particular means, thus leading Bhow-
mick (2015) to refer to effectuation as resource-dependent action and to enactment 
as resource-independent action.
In sum, both effectuation and enactment are designed to match uncertain condi-
tions and preclude the making of meaningful predictions, whereas causation con-
siders well-structured environments under risk and largely builds on predictions of 
future states of affairs. Figure 1 illustrates the inchoate range of processes that leaves 
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room for a process of entrepreneurial decision-making capable of both incorporating 
uncertainty and building on prognoses.
2.2.2  Recognition of structural defects
Bhowmick (2015: 528) has argued that “under uncertainty, entrepreneurial actions 
have a non-causation basis” and thus classes causation as a tool for entrepreneur-
ial action under risk rather than uncertainty. Similarly, causation has been directly 
linked to well-structured, risky decision problems (Sarasvathy 2001). We follow 
both Sarasvathy (2001) and Bhowmick (2015) in their classification of causation, 
and, thus, deviate from Packard et al. (2017) in this respect who characterize causal 
approaches as a means of transforming absolute uncertainty into creative uncertainty 
aiming to arrive at a manageable decision problem.
If causation falls into the scope of well-structured decision problems, then struc-
tural defects are meaningless and can neither be recognized nor addressed. Unlike 
causation, neither effectuation nor enactment have been subject to an investigation 
of whether the concepts recognize structural defects with which the decision prob-
lem they are designed to solve may be afflicted and, if so, how they try to address 
them. This is surprising, given that both effectuation and enactment are two ways of 
dealing with uncertain, and hence ill-structured, decision problems.
Effectuation rests on the idea that entrepreneurs start with a given set of means, 
particularly with who the entrepreneur is, what he or she knows, and whom he or 
she knows (Sarasvathy 2001, 2008). The entrepreneur then imagines potential 
effects that can be created with the available means and eventually selects one of 
those effects in light of his or her (contingent) aspirations based on what he or she 
considers an affordable amount of loss.
Effectuation implicitly recognizes at least three structural defects and incorpo-
rates particular ways of addressing them: First, the effectuator lacks a consistent 
goal to be targeted and hence suffers from a goal defect. Effectuation proposes 
the entrepreneur refers to general, contingent, and, thus, vague human aspirations 
Fig. 1  Decision processes in light of both the degree of unknowingness and their stance on predictions
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as its reply to this dilemma. Second, the effectuator is quite unaware of how to 
appraise different imagined effects and consequently suffers from an appraise-
ment defect. Effectuation, again, provisionally suggests a quite general and vague 
criterion for the appraisement and selection of one particular effect, namely 
affordable loss as its attempt to resolve the ill-structuredness. Third, while the 
entrepreneur’s set of means is taken for granted, the particular outcomes of avail-
able options are uncertain. Therefore, the effectuator is confronted with a causal-
ity defect. The “solution” to this issue as implied in effectuation is to imagine 
possible effects that can be created with the set of means and, therefore, to arti-
ficially close the initially open set of outcomes. Figure 2 illustrates effectuation’s 
relation to structural defects and its attempts to resolve them.
In sum, effectuation indeed implicitly recognizes various structural defects 
and, hence, the ill-structuredness of the decision problem it is designed to deal 
with and includes different ways to resolve the various defects. Therefore, effec-
tuation can be understood as a means of partly reducing the perceived degree of 
ill-structuredness and, eventually, of arriving at a manageable decision problem 
through a particular degree of pre-structuring.
Like effectuation, enactment too is a process of entrepreneurial decision-mak-
ing in the face of uncertainty and, hence, ill-structuredness. Unlike effectuation, 
however, enactment does not include any pre-structuring of the decision problem 
and instead emphasizes the initial non-directed action and the sensemaking of 
what was done only ex post. Therefore, even though decision problems suitable 
for enactment are afflicted with structural defects, enactment itself remains silent 
on them and, thus, does not address them. Rather than addressing the ill-struc-
turedness, enactment simply bypasses its implications through action preceding 
thought (Weick 1979, 1995).
Fig. 2  Structural defects recognized in effectuation and attempts at resolution
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2.2.3  What does the problem structure reveal about the range of possible 
decision‑making processes?
As outlined above, decision problems may either be well-structured or ill-structured, 
the latter to different degrees, depending on both the amount and magnitude of struc-
tural defects associated with the ill-structuredness. To this point we have discussed 
three existing decision-making processes and related them to either well-structuredness 
or ill-structuredness, respectively. We distinguished each of these processes based on 
whether or not it recognizes structural defects.
Moreover, they can be differentiated according to the role of prognoses in the pro-
cesses. While effectuation at least implicitly recognizes various structural defects, it 
denies prognoses a key role. Enactment, in contrast, skips recognizing and addressing 
structural defects while similar to effectuation, prognoses are not central to the pro-
cess either. Even though it is indeed true that both effectuation and enactment reject the 
logic of prediction on a fundamental level, the degree to which they do so varies. While 
it can be argued that every action is aimed at improving the state of affairs (von Mises 
1949) and, hence, implies an expectation and, thus, a prediction of how the action can 
improve this state, enactment in some sense largely gets along without any reference to 
explicit prediction putting action before sensemaking.
Effectuation, however, while emphasizing the logic of control and differentiating 
itself from causation through rejecting the logic of prediction, still requires a certain 
degree of prediction and planning. It is, for instance, necessary when trying to imag-
ine effects possibly creatable with the given means or when deciding on the level of 
affordable loss. That is because a particular loss can only be affordable in light of other 
obligations the effectuator faces in the future. Sarasvathy (2001: 260, emphasis added) 
seems to acknowledge the fact that the process she suggests requires some planning 
when she states, “effectuation does not involve elaborate planning.”
Causation bypasses structural defects simply because it is designed to deal with 
decision problems in well-structured situations where there are none, while relying 
heavily on prognoses which are key to causation.
Analyzing the range of existing decision-making processes in light of both the 
potential recognition of structural defects and the role they give to prognoses reveals 
that the range is incomplete. It lacks a process which recognizes the ill-structuredness 
of the decision problems entrepreneurs usually face yet puts prognoses center stage. 
Therefore, this paper outlines a process incorporating these attributes that we term exe-
cution. Table 1 summarizes the positioning of effectuation, enactment, causation, and 
execution with regard to the recognition of structural defects and the role of prognoses.
3  An outline of execution as a process of entrepreneurial 
decision‑making
3.1  Process features
Apart from strengthening the awareness among entrepreneurship scholars of the 
concept of ill-structuredness and its usefulness for theorizing about entrepreneurial 
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decision-making in general, this paper also seeks to outline foundational elements of 
execution as a means of decision-making in uncertain, ill-structured situations.
The Cambridge Dictionary offers one definition of execution as, “the act of 
doing or performing something, especially in a planned way.” Similarly, the Oxford 
Dictionary paraphrases execution as the “carrying out of a plan, order, or course 
of action.” Applied to our specific context of entrepreneurial decision-making in 
ill-structured decision situations, we define our execution tenet as: a dynamic and 
recursive process of planning by means of pre-structuring a decision problem per-
ceived as ill-structured, through subjectively resolving identified structural defects 
and applying judgment to decide and act upon the decision problem once its struc-
ture has been sufficiently improved.
Hence, execution shares features of both causation and effectuation.1 While it 
rests on the logic of prediction, it recognizes the entire range of structural defects 
and, consequently, rejects simple extrapolations and attempts at optimization analy-
ses. In some sense, it can be referred to as causation’s pendant under uncertainty, 
integrating the missing piece of ill-structuredness and the implications flowing from 
it into the decision-making process. The central question is: How would such inte-
gration look?
Execution requires the perception of decision problems as ill-structured from the 
outset; hence, execution cannot aim to deliver optimal decision-making but offers a 
route to satisficing (Simon 1976) solutions to decision problems. If a decision envi-
ronment is perceived as ill-structured, it suffers from at least one (but likely several) 
structural defect(s) (Adam and Witte 1979; Wilson and Alexis 1962; Witte 1979). 
Dealing with such situations via execution rests on the idea of heuristically address-
ing and resolving the identified structural defects and combining the resulting partial 
solutions to eventually reach a practicable overall solution (Adam 1983).









1 In contrast to effectuation, which has directly been linked to new venture creation in particular (Sar-
asvathy 2001), execution is wider in scope: It is applicable to entrepreneurial decision-making in both 
start-ups and well-established firms, including family firms (and, hence, the form of entrepreneurship 
primarily studied in Review of Managerial Science, see Mas-Tur et al. 2020).
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If an entrepreneur is faced by competing ends, for instance, resolving such a goal 
defect may be achieved by specifying the extent of each of the targeted ends, for 
example, a particular minimum number of jobs to be created or a minimum level 
of liquidity available. Not knowing the entire range of both options to act and their 
possible outcomes, that is, facing a causality defect, may be addressed by means of 
imagining and, as such, subjectively populating both the option and outcome sets 
(Packard et  al. 2017) and excluding scenarios conflicting with the intended goals. 
Dealing with identified structural defects in such a way is a helpful means to pre-
structure the problem and reduce its overall complexity. Which path of action the 
entrepreneur eventually favors largely depends on the goals pursued and the entre-
preneur’s predictions of how the future will look.
Consider an entrepreneur who is eager to enter the fashion market: While bear-
ing financial ends in mind, she also seeks to manufacture her fashion wear in an 
environmentally friendly way and to do good by employing socially disadvantaged 
members of her local community. Simultaneously striving for those goals could cre-
ate a goal conflict. Both considering environmental issues and employing members 
of the local community might increase costs compared to possible alternatives, such 
as, outsourcing production to South-East Asia. In other words, the entrepreneur’s 
non-financial goals are likely to negatively impact the firm’s financial outcomes. In 
order to resolve that goal conflict, the entrepreneur might pragmatically operational-
ize the desired non-financial goals and seek to attain the best possible financial out-
come on condition the other two goals are met. For instance, the entrepreneur might 
consider the environmental objective to be met if the firm only uses organic fabrics 
and the social goal to be met if at least 50% of the firm’s workforce meets the cri-
teria of being both socially disadvantaged and from the entrepreneur’s community.
Apart from the goal defect, our entrepreneur must also deal with a causal-
ity defect because she lacks complete insight into both potential options and their 
outcomes. The fashion entrepreneur will be confronted with many choices, includ-
ing over fabrics, colors, cuts, styles, and sales channels, all of which come with 
unknown future effects. Our fashion entrepreneur might first discard options that 
clash with her goals; that might, for instance, entail rejecting all options based on 
non-organic fabrics or manufacturing in South-East Asia. The entrepreneur subjec-
tively populates the sets of both options and outcomes by imagining possible paths 
of action and making educated guesses about the respective future state of affairs. A 
potential outcome for this particular entrepreneur could be to produce comfortable 
infant’s clothing in natural tones made from organic cotton to be sold both online 
and in local children’s clothing stores.
While execution thus understood will not be optimizing (which is out of reach 
under ill-structuredness anyway), it certainly both supports necessary entrepreneur-
ial judgment and allows for a satisfying decision in uncertain, ill-structured con-
ditions. Because entrepreneurial decision-making is not well captured in terms of 
one-time decisions but as dynamic and continuous processes instead (Packard et al. 
2017; Shepherd et al. 2015; Wood et al. 2017), execution takes a largely processual 
form. The heuristic process of complexity reduction through pre-structuring an ini-
tially intractable problem may require several recursion loops (Adam 1996) before 
the initially ill-structured problem is perceived as somewhat better structured and, 
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thus, pragmatically solvable. Once a decision has been taken and as time passes, 
new information arises demanding subsequent revisions of the initial action and, 
hence, subsequent judgment and action (Packard et al. 2017).
3.2  Decision‑making processes as a function of the problem structure
3.2.1  Fit with problem structure
Objectivity is not a property of the structure of decision problems. While there are 
objective facts associated with each particular problem, there is no objective meas-
ure of whether or not it is ill-structured and, if so, to what degree. Characterizing a 
problem as ill-structured must necessarily result from an individual entrepreneur’s 
personal perception. Because entrepreneurs differ in their subjective perceptions of 
the environment and the general circumstances relevant to their actions (Karhu and 
Ritala 2020; Shepherd et al. 2015), perceptions about the structure of a particular 
decision problem will necessarily differ from one entrepreneur to another. Hence, 
the selection of a decision-making process can only be suitable in light of a particu-
lar perception of the underlying problem (Beckert and Bronk 2018). Neither process 
is generally superior to its alternatives, but its usefulness depends on the circum-
stances the entrepreneur faces and interprets subjectively (Gigerenzer 2008; Giger-
enzer and Gaissmaier 2011; Sarasvathy 2001).
Nevertheless, decision-making processes designed to deal with uncertainty and 
ill-structuredness respectively, namely effectuation, enactment, and execution, differ 
fundamentally from each other with regard to how they suit different perceived deci-
sion contexts. They can particularly be distinguished by the degree of specificity of 
certain decision parameters, namely end(s), means, and the selection criterion.
Execution is the most specified process among the three mentioned. It specifically 
recognizes the role of ends, means, and the selection criterion and incorporates them 
into the process. Effectuation does so to a lesser degree: While it relies heavily on 
the means available to the effectuator, both ends (in the form of general human aspi-
rations) and the selection criterion (affordable loss however determined) are quite 
vague. Enactment requires decision parameters to be even less specified. There is no 
clear place for either ends or a selection criterion and even if means must play some 
role (as one has to employ some means to do something) there is no direct reference 
to the role of means, which is expressed quite well in Bhowmick’s (2015) depiction 
of enactment as resource-independent action.
Table 2 provides an overview of the degree of specificity of the decision-mak-
ing processes designed to address uncertain, ill-structured decision problems with 
regard to ends, means, and the selection criterion.
Execution, effectuation, and enactment are three different tools applicable to deal 
with ill-structured decision problems. Even though the answer to the question of 
which of these processes fits which particular decision best, only depends on the 
personal perception of the acting entrepreneur about the decision circumstances, 
in general, we can ascertain that the three processes constitute a range reflecting 
options suitable to deal with different degrees of ill-structuredness. We can tell that 
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the more a problem is perceived as ill-structured and, as such, the more a problem 
is perceived as vague and unspecified, the more superior effectuation and enactment 
might be to execution (albeit slightly ill-structured problems that are perceived as 
risky rather than uncertain might be a good fit for effectuation, too, as argued by 
Welter and Kim (2017)).
The less the decision circumstances allow for a sufficient amount of planning 
through pre-structuring the ill-structured problem, the better effectuation and par-
ticularly enactment seem to fit. Accordingly, the range of possible processes gen-
erally goes from execution via effectuation to enactment with regard to the degree 
of ill-structuredness, vagueness, and lack of specificity of the underlying decision 
problem. However, focusing on the degree of detailed planning associated with 
each of the processes, the range goes from enactment via effectuation to execution 
and, hence, vice versa. It follows that less ill-structured, less vague, more specified 
problems allow for a more sophisticated planning and, hence, for the application of 
execution.
Figure 3 illustrates the range of possible decision-making processes in light of the 
degree of ill-structuredness, vagueness, and lack of specificity at one extreme and 
their inherent degree of detailed planning at the other.
3.2.2  Temporality of the entrepreneurial journey
Entrepreneurial decisions like that to enter or literally create a specific market with a 
particular (revolutionary) product, can barely be described in terms of isolated one-
time decision problems that can be solved just once and permanently. Instead, judg-
mental entrepreneurial decision-making must be viewed as a continuous and recur-
sive process (McMullen 2015; McMullen and Dimov 2013; Packard et  al. 2017) 
and, as such, in terms of a period of time rather than a point in time.
The temporality of the entrepreneurial journey implies that entrepreneurs’ per-
ceptions of their circumstances alter as time passes. Corbett (2007) emphasizes the 
importance not only of what one knows, but also of how one processes new infor-
mation. Such new information, and particularly that acquired through learning and 
experience (Mitchell and Shepherd 2012), will naturally make entrepreneurs change 
how they regard their decision environment (Knight 1921). While it has been argued 
that Bayesian learning is at odds with Knightian uncertainty and, thus, unsuited for 
situations regularly faced by entrepreneurs (Packard et  al. 2017), its fundamental 
Table 2  Specificity of decision-making processes in ill-structured situations
Decision-making processes in ill-structured deci-
sion situations
Execution Effectuation Enactment
Recognition of… …ends + ± –
…means + + ±
…selection criterion + ± –
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idea of differing decision bases a priori and a posteriori respectively, can be trans-
ferred into the sphere of the entrepreneurial journey in a less formalized fashion.
We agree with Beckert and Bronk (2018) and Knight (1921) who argue that most 
decisions with regard to their degree of unknowingness are neither black nor white 
but various shades of gray. Hence, while the entrepreneur utilizes his or her spe-
cific knowledge (Wood and Williams 2014) about some things, other aspects are 
unknown and possibly unknowable. Therefore, entrepreneurs imagine potential 
future scenarios (Klein 2008) by drawing on their specific individual state of a priori 
knowledge. Once the initial decision has been taken (i.e., a posteriori), the founda-
tion of the decision will be changed owing to the improved information base. There-
fore, entrepreneurs might also subsequently reevaluate how they perceive the struc-
ture of a particular decision problem in their ongoing judgment and, consequently, 
the process they apply to that problem (similarly Jiang and Tornikoski 2019 who 
analyze the relation between perceived uncertainty and process selection).
Different directions can be imagined: It seems quite obvious that particularly 
when a product never seen before shall be launched, processes emphasizing the role 
of acting itself without much reference to structured pre-planning and prognoses 
can serve as a reasonable starting point, namely enactment and effectuation, which 
might even be applied complementarily (Bhowmick 2015). Effectuation has been 
directly linked to new ventures, new products, new markets (Sarasvathy 2001) and it 
therefore has a narrower field of application than execution. As time goes by, entre-
preneurs learn and acquire experience that might impel them to switch from enact-
ment or effectuation toward execution if they perceive the altered structure of the 
problem suitable.
However, even ventures that will create a new market are not limited to effec-
tuation or enactment; but might instead be a good fit for execution. For instance, 
although Jeff Bezos was about to pioneer e-commerce with Amazon, he did so with 
structured financial planning and an emphasis on maximizing future return rather 
than with recourse to a certain amount of affordable loss (Stone 2013). Moreover, he 
was equipped with a range of quite specific goals rather than merely vague general 
human aspirations (Stone 2013).
Fig. 3  Perceived ill-structuredness and decision-making processes
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While learning and experience might cause entrepreneurs to switch from effec-
tuation or enactment to execution in their subsequent judgment, the direction might 
run vice versa too. Research finds that entrepreneurs can be prone to overconfidence 
(Busenitz and Barney 1997; McKelvie et al. 2011; Shepherd et al. 2015; Townsend 
et al. 2010; Wu and Knott 2006; Zacharakis and Shepherd 2001) and one result of 
such overconfidence can be the application of execution to a problem unsuitable for 
the process. An inexperienced entrepreneur entering a market for the first time with 
a novel product, for example, might falsely—which she can learn only ex post—per-
ceive the decision problem as ill-structured to a degree that allows pre-planning and 
predicting. However, if it turns out that the execution process was inappropriate, the 
entrepreneur might alter her ideas about applying effectuation or enactment, if the 
initial decision did not prove fatal to the business. Regardless, the selection of a pro-
cess to be applied to entrepreneurial decision-making is related to the life cycle of a 
product and/or an entire firm.
If an entrepreneur is not eager to enter a market with an innovative product but 
seeks to imitate other competitive products, execution seems to be a good starting 
point given the history of other products and firms manufacturing them. In that case, 
the entrepreneur essentially does not have to learn and experience everything alone 
and can benefit from the observable actions of others (Rae and Carswell 2000).
Different decision-making processes can also certainly be used within the same 
firm simultaneously. For instance, if a particular business has offered a specific 
product in one market for decades and can therefore address pending decisions with 
execution, it might at the same time plan on penetrating a foreign market that has 
never seen a similar product. Given that the potential consumers in the foreign mar-
ket might be quite different from the consumers in the domestic market, perhaps 
owing to fundamentally different cultural values and norms (Hofstede 1980; Steen-
kamp et al. 1999), it can be wise to start off with an enactment- or effectuation-based 
process rather than confidently applying experience acquired in the domestic market 
in a new foreign one.
3.2.3  Entrepreneur? Which entrepreneur?
The literature offers different concepts of who is an entrepreneur or who acts entre-
preneurially and the range spans from very broad understandings of entrepreneur-
ship to quite narrow ones (Klein 2008; Salerno 2008). It has been argued (justifiably 
in the authors’ opinion) that most human action is in some sense entrepreneurial as 
it is undertaken in the face of uncertainty (Herbener 1992; von Mises 1949). At the 
other end of the scale, some literature prefers to very tightly define entrepreneurship 
as relating only to actions with reference to start-up firms (e.g., Kim 2015). Nei-
ther extreme is particularly useful for our discussion, and we therefore follow Klein 
(2008), Salerno (2008), and others in focusing on the middle ground between the 
two, incorporating far more than only start-up ventures while not considering any 
human action specifically entrepreneurial.
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Moreover, entrepreneurship has inter alia been discussed as an (at most) analyti-
cally distinct function (“pure entrepreneur”) (Kirzner 1973) and based on a more 
practical approach characterizing entrepreneurs as having ownership of the means of 
production and, as such, being the ultimate decision-makers (Foss and Klein 2012; 
Klein and Klein 2001; Salerno 2008). The latter concept reveals that “the entrepre-
neur is nearly always also a capitalist, and the capitalist is also an entrepreneur” 
(Klein 1999: 21).
While execution can be the ideal decision-making process for any entrepreneur 
independent of the market she acts in while contingent on the actual decision she 
faces and her perception of the problem structure, it seems particularly suited for 
the specific cases of the financial-market entrepreneur (Klein 1999) or “financiers as 
entrepreneurs” (Klein 2008). Investors must not be misunderstood as mere passive 
funders of entrepreneurial ventures; rather, they are entrepreneurs themselves (Land-
ström 1998), exercising judgment on the allocation of their scarce means among 
their investment opportunities, doing so under conditions of uncertainty, aiming to 
make profit. Scholars in the Austrian tradition such as von Mises (1949), Rothbard 
(1962), and Klein (1999) have even argued that the “capitalist-entrepreneur” plays 
the most important role in the market economy and can be viewed as the driving 
force behind it.
While there is no natural necessity for this particular class of entrepreneurs to 
make use of execution, this process tends to be the primary vehicle suitable to 
address investors’ decision problems. In general, they would rather not build on pro-
cesses that bypass sufficient pre-planning along with prognostic elements, which 
means that neither effectuation nor enactment naturally seem the best fit. That is also 
because investors usually act on their personal anticipation of future returns (Klein 
1999), a feature that is missing in these processes.2 Therefore, even when particular 
entrepreneurs appear as effectuators or “enacters” creating their venture, execution 
might still play an important role in those ventures if the effectuators or “enacters” 
seek external financing by a financial-market entrepreneur. As Hsu (2004: 1805) 
points out, “convincing external resource providers such as venture capitalists to 
provide financial capital may be challenging” and to do so might actually be a func-
tion of how plausibly effectuators or “enacters” can communicate how they imag-
ine their business will develop in the future. A mere reference to vaguely imagined 
effects—or in the words of Sarasvathy (2001: 262), “when destinations are unclear 
and there are no preexistent goals”—in case of effectuation or to the general and 
loose idea of action before sensemaking in enactment might be insufficient to con-
vince the financial-market entrepreneur to invest. This, in fact, might have been the 
reason why Jeff Bezos deliberately worked out a business plan, including “typing 
revenue projections into an Excel spreadsheet” (Stone 2013: 29), before pitching his 
venture to potential investors (Stone 2013).
2 This is not to say, however, that investors abstain completely from applying effectual logics. Wiltbank 
et al. (2009), for instance, investigate differences among angel investors using predictive, causal logics 
versus those who opt for effectual logics.
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4  Conclusion
Judgmental decision-making is the very essence of entrepreneurship. We build on 
the notion of ill-structured decision problems being typical of the decisions facing 
entrepreneurs. The analysis reveals that the range of decision-making processes dis-
cussed so far comprising causation, effectuation, and enactment is somewhat incom-
plete. Therefore, we delineate fundamental features of a novel process that we term 
execution to fill the missing segment. Execution recognizes the potential ill-struc-
turedness of problems, incorporates prognoses, and approaches the problem through 
pre-structuring it. The latter activity is completed by resolving the respective struc-
tural defects associated with it to allow for an improved problem structure and, even-
tually, a satisficing decision outcome when optimal solutions are simply unavailable.
Neither of the processes is generally better or worse than its counterparts; whether 
or not a particular process is more or less helpful only depends on the entrepreneur’s 
personal perception of the structure of the decision problem. Each process generally 
fits specific circumstances better than the other processes and, hence, each has its 
particular field of application.
The entrepreneur’s perception, however, cannot be static in a dynamic, ever-
changing environment. Therefore, we take a processual perspective in arguing that 
the temporality of the entrepreneurial journey necessitates changing perceptions as 
time goes by, resulting in altering selections of suitable decision-making processes 
in the entrepreneur’s ongoing judgment. We suggest that focusing on ill-structured-
ness better links entrepreneurship research to valuable insights from decision theory, 
and hence provides a more comprehensive picture of entrepreneurial decision-mak-
ing, which lays the ground for new directions in entrepreneurship research.
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